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Abstract
This paper is designed to provide a preliminary under-
standing of the barriers facing refugees in legal limbo in
Canada. In particular, it will focus on the economic impli-
cations, for both protected persons and Canadian society
at large, of maintaining tens of thousands of individuals
in this difficult situation for extended periods of time. The
findings are preliminary, and designed to indicate future
avenues of research, as well as potential roadblocks to re-
search in this area. The paper also includes some of the re-
sults of a survey of Convention refugees and the
refugee-supporting organizations, conducted by the Public
Justice Resource Centre. The initial conclusions indicate
that the costs of limbo are large enough to warrant serious
reconsideration of this stage of Canada’s refugee determi-
nation policy. The rationale for this study was to help key
decision makers see the futility and the unnecessary cost to
the government of keeping refugees in limbo.
Résumé
Cet article vise à fournir une compréhension initiale des
obstacles confrontant les réfugiés qui se retrouvent dans
un état juridique indéterminé au Canada. Il se penchera
en particulier sur les implications économiques à la fois
pour les personnes protégées et la société canadienne en
général de garder des dizaines de milliers d’individus
dans cette situation difficile pendant des périodes éten-
dues. Les résultats sont encore préliminaires et sont con-
çus pour indiquer les voies de recherche pour l’avenir,
aussi bien que les obstacles possibles à la recherche dans
ce domaine. L’article propose aussi des extraits des résul-
tats d’un sondage effectué auprès des réfugiés et d’organis-
mes de soutien aux réfugiés par le Public Justice Resource
Centre (Centre de ressources pour la justice publique).
Les conclusions initiales indiquent que les coûts de cet
état indéterminé sont suffisamment élevés pour justifier
une sérieuse remise en question de cette étape dans la po-
litique de reconnaissance des réfugiés. Le raisonnement
pour entreprendre cette étude était d’aider les décision-
naires-clés à voir la futilité et le gâchis superflu de garder
les réfugiés dans un état indéterminé.
Preface
Fleeing the devastating consequences of twenty years ofcivil war and the repressive Taliban regime, Khalidafled to Canada from Afghanistan in early March 1999.1
To Khalida, Canada was a utopia of hope and as a refugee
she wished to forget her past, start fresh, and be reunited
with her children who had fled the year before and were
staying with family in Toronto. But for Khalida the benevo-
lent and welcoming Canada she expected has not been the
country she experiences.2
In night I sometimes can not sleep and I just walk and
walk around the lobby [of my apartment building],” she
says. Her stress is palpable. She is not old but frail from the
stress that characterizes her eyes and marks her face.
Khalida is a Convention refugee and has applied for perma-
nent resident status in Canada with her husband also on her
application. When she is granted status her husband will be
able to join them in Canada. However, it has been four years
since she was granted Convention refugee status, much
longer than official timetable of six to twelve months for
determining status stated on the Citizenship and Immigra-
tion Canada Web site. She has not heard from the govern-
ment officer assigned to her case in six months. When she
does hear, they repeat a mantra now all too familiar to the
family – they are waiting on security checks.
They are “not giving any response, but we need our dad
as soon as possible,” Khalida’s daughter and oldest child
tells me. His absence is a large part of our conversation and
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obviously has a depressing effect on the family’s mood.
“The stress of my mom is being too much for us and it is
because my dad is not here,” the daughter continues. “One
person is supposed to stay with my mom but I can’t because
I have to work.” Khalida concurs, “I can no longer take care
of  my children  when  they’re  missing  all the  time their
father. They need their father. Even sometimes my family
asking ‘where is he’ and other kids at [my children’s]
schools are asking.”
The situation of Khalida and her family is not uncom-
mon in Canada. Over twenty thousand Convention refu-
gees like her are awaiting permanent resident status, or
what used to be called “landed immigrant” status. They are
unable to get on with their lives while issues relating to
criminality, security, and identity documents are sorted
out. In the process, the government spends millions of
dollars unnecessarily. For refugees, for the government and
therefore the Canadian taxpayer, it is a lose-lose situation.
During this stage in their refugee determination process,
refugees are in limbo. They are withheld rights that Canada
must provide under its international obligations. Refugees
encounter barriers to employment, mobility, training pro-
grams, and access to adequate health care and democratic
rights, ones that someday will eventually be theirs since
refugees may not be removed from Canada.
Introduction
This paper was designed to provide a preliminary under-
standing of the barriers facing refugees in legal limbo in
Canada – those awaiting, often for years, permanent resident
status. In particular, we wished to focus on the economic
implications, for both protected persons and Canadian so-
ciety at large, of maintaining tens of thousands of individuals
in this difficult situation for extended periods of time. Such
research would provide an important element of a broader
argument, most frequently articulated on humanitarian
grounds, that suggests that the costs of limbo are large enough
to warrant serious reconsideration of this stage of Canada’s
refugee determination policy. The rationale for this study was
to help key decision makers see the futility and the unnecessary
cost to the government of keeping refugees in limbo.
As of 2003, there were over 16,200 cases of refugees in
“limbo,” involving almost 22,000 people.3 For many refu-
gees, limbo in Canada is not a short-term affliction. While
there is no official statistic from Citizenship and Immigra-
tion Canada (CIC), several people in the refugee support
community have stated that the current wait is at least
eighteen months.4 A variety of factors contribute to a sig-
nificantly longer waiting period. Some refugees interviewed
for this study have been in limbo for eleven, twelve, even
thirteen years.
This study is a preliminary attempt to compare the costs
and benefits to Canada of keeping refugees in limbo. This,
as we anticipated and subsequently confirmed, is very dif-
ficult to quantify. Cost studies in general are complex; they
demand sophisticated technical skills and training in meth-
odology and economics. Attempts to quantify social and
economic phenomena often require assumptions so that
information fits reality. This study is built around the as-
sumption that being trapped in limbo directly and indi-
rectly creates extra costs and it is possible to quantify
barriers to refugee integration. These were found through
interviews with settlement agencies and our Convention
refugee questionnaire. At this point an important caveat
needs to be added: The economic costs to Canada found in
this study are above what  would normally be incurred
through the refugee determination system, without an ex-
tended period of limbo as currently exists.
Our findings point to clear evidence of significant costs
both to Canada as a whole and to refugees themselves who
are left in legal limbo. The difficulty of obtaining informa-
tion, however, makes this a preliminary study which will
requirefurtherworkshouldapolicychangenotbeforthcoming.
This paper is divided into four sections. The first part will
review the state of refugees in Canada and how the process
for In-Canada Refugee Protection operates, what has
changed since September 11, 2001, and how these changes
open a window of opportunity for necessary policy changes.
Section two briefly discusses our research methodology and
outlines gaps in the literature of economic research in refugee
issues. During limbo, refugees face many barriers to integra-
tion. These will be analyzed in the third part, while the final
section presents the economic costs these barriers produce.
Part 1. Refugees: Yesterday and Today
Canada has a reputation as one of the most “refugee
friendly” of all the world’s nations, with innovative pro-
grams and compassion for the displaced. In 1986, UNHCR
awarded Canada the prestigious Nansen Medal (the only
occasion in which it has been given to a country), for its
“major and sustained contribution to the cause of refugees.”
Since World War II, nearly a million refugees have found a
new home in Canada.
While a majority of Canada’s history with non-Western
European immigration has been marked by high barriers
and racism, policies and attitudes changed in the late twen-
tieth century. Large changes occurred with the emergence
of the Immigration Act in 1976. Selection criteria for inde-
pendent immigrants were broadened while refugees were
identified as a separate class from immigrants. The Immi-
gration and Refugee Board was created in 1988 to review
claims of refugee claimants and select them based on estab-
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lished criteria. More recently, since September 11, 2001,
and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA),
which came into force on June 28, 2002, sweeping changes
have been made to the asylum determination procedures,
the impact of which is still to be assessed. One of the most
troubling of IRPA’s features is the greatly expanded powers
granted to authorities to detain foreign nationals without a
warrant if there’s “reasonable grounds” to believe the per-
son is a threat to the public.5
IRPA and September 11, 2001
Canadian immigration and refugee policies have come un-
der intense scrutiny in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.
Many American officials and media outlets have pointed
fingers at Canada, accusing Canada of being soft on terror-
ism and stating that its immigration and refugee policies are
gifts to terrorists trying to enter the U.S.6 Even Canadian
Daniel Stoffman, in his book Who Gets In, says, “Canada is
indeed a terrorist threat, both to itself and to its neighbors.”7
He quotes an American immigration think-tank, saying,
“Terrorists from all over the world have been using Canada’s
asylum system… You can come in [to Canada] with no
documents, or fake documents, and say you want asylum
and they let you in.”8
This is the harsh environment refugees encounter when
arriving in Canada and the politics refugee workers must
sift through in order to do their job. However, any serious
analysis of the refugee determination system will find that
it does not pose any terrorist threat. A 2001 report prepared
for Citizenship and Immigration Canada on undocu-
mented refugees found that out of a group of 2,161 undocu-
mented persons who applied for permanent resident status,
only one failed the criminal check.9 Only one involved a
person with crimes sufficient to warrant a denial of land-
ing.10 A further discussion on the images and portrayal of
refugees post-September 11 is beyond the scope of this
paper. However, it is worth quoting a passage from a recent
piece by Howard Adelman at length:
It is clear that terrorism aimed at North America is a real threat
and both aggressive and defensive measures must be taken to
combat it. Though some of those defensive measures include
enhanced immigration controls, there is virtually no evidence
linking global terrorism with refugees. … There is even more
evidence that the security threat – which is real and palpable –
has been used as a cover to cut down on the entry of refugee
claimants coming to Canada whether through visa controls or
through the proposed implementation of a safe third-country
system. If there are justifications for this indirect cutback by
greater restrictions on access to the system, one of them is not
security; the security issue is a rationale rather than a reason.11
Refugee and Protected Persons in Canada
Two types of refugees are recognized by Canada. Those
sponsored overseas by the government or a private group
and brought to Canada are called “resettled refugees,” and
are granted permanent residency (formerly known as landed
status) immediately upon arrival in Canada. The second
group, those individuals who go through the inland refugee
determination system, are those who enter Canada by land,
sea, or air and claim asylum from persecution. Under the
IRPA, the latter group is included in the new category of
“protected persons,” which includes, but is not strictly lim-
ited to, Convention refugees. For the purposes of this article,
we are concerned with people whose refugee claims have
been accepted in Canada but who have not yet achieved
permanent resident status. The following is a brief summary
of the refugee determination system.12
Upon arrival in Canada, the refugee claimant makes a
claim at a border point or from within Canada for asylum.
Citizenship and Immigration Canada receives the claim and
decides within three days whether or not the claimant is
eligible. Claimants for asylum in Canada are not eligible if they:
• are found  to have made a refugee  claim  in Canada
before;
• are recognized by another country as a refugee;
• came to Canada through a “safe third country”;
• have been determined to be inadmissible because of
security, criminality, organized criminality, or violating
human or international rights.
If eligible, the claimant is referred to the Refugee Proc-
essing Division (RPD) of the Immigration and Refugee
Board (IRB) and has twenty-eight days from the time of the
claim to complete and send a Personal Information Form
(PIF) to the IRB. The IRB is an independent quasi-tribunal
that hears and makes a determination with regard to the
credibility of a claim for refugee status.
A claimant accepted by the IRB becomes a protected
person and can apply for permanent residence. A claimant
refused by the IRB can apply for judicial review to the
Federal Court and also for a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment.
This study is concerned only with those claimants accepted
by the IRB and hence deemed protected persons. They now
enter a state often referred to as “legal limbo.” They may
have peace of mind in knowing they can not be sent home
and enjoy more rights and opportunities as claimants, but
face numerous obstacles and delays prior to enjoying the
rights and privileges of permanent residents.
As stated above and explored further below, without perma-
nent resident status, refugees must endure unnecessary hard-
ships. The Canadian Council of Refugees (CCR) identifies three
main reasons why Convention refugees can experience long
delays in waiting to become permanent residents.13
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1. Identity documents.A legislative amendment introduced
in 1993 requires Convention refugees to produce “satisfac-
tory identity documents” before they can be granted perma-
nent residence. The lack of identity documents for Afghanis
and Somalis helps explain why many of them remain in legal
limbo. Citizens of Sri Lanka have also been heavily affected:
indeed, Convention refugees from Somalia, Sri Lanka, and
Pakistan combine to make 36 per cent of all refugees in limbo
(see box 1.1). To  accommodate the growing number of
refugees without IDs, undocumented claimants arriving in
Canada can use section 178 of the IRPA regulations, which
allows statutory declarations that attest to a person’s identity
to replace the need for presenting an official ID.
2. Fees. Refugee claimants can expect to pay significant fees
in order to become permanent residents. Since 1994 all Con-
vention refugees must pay a $550 processing fee per adult and
$100 per child.
3. Security Checks. After passing the IRB, a Convention
refugee’s background is checked again before being ap-
proved for permanent residence. The Canadian Security
Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP) perform background checks us-
ing different systems, and must also coordinate with offi-
cials in the originating country as well as those in any other
country of previous residence. Performed on different sys-
tems and largely uncoordinated between organizations,
security certificates expire every eighteen months, and must
be revalidated after this time, amounting to more delays.
These security checks are an exact repeat of what now
occurs at the point of making a claim and the IRB determi-
nation process. They are effectively redundant. In any case,
there are methods available to the government should a
recognized refugee or permanent resident be found to have
lied on their original application or be otherwise deemed
ineligible. Under the IRPA and the Citizenship Act, the
Minister can revoke both permanent resident and refugee
status, providing effective safeguards for mistakes earlier in
the system.14
Several other reasons can lead to limbo delays, including
pressure from the system itself. If a refugee fails to apply for
landing within 180 days of being granted Convention refu-
gee status (with the accompanying $550 fee) they then may
apply for permanent residency only under the humanitar-
ian and compassionate stream (H&C) of the immigration
procedure – where documentation guidelines and other
conditions are much more stringent.
Part 2. Methodology and Research Notes
Refugee Economics
Immigration issues have been a frequent topic of academic,
policy, and political studies and discussions; nevertheless,
there is a surprising dearth of economic studies concerning
refugees. While it is a topic of frequent political and media
discussion, the economic impact of refugees has been infre-
quently and unevenly studied.15 This may be due to the
scarcity of quantitative and statistical information concern-
ing refugees. The Canadian census, the most regular and
comprehensive source of data, does not distinguish be-
tween immigrants and refugees, leading to the frequent
“lumping together” of these two groups for the purposes of
academic and policy studies.
Another problem with studying this topic is that much
of the current research does not focus on the impact of
protected persons on host countries. Most studies do not
distinguish labour migrants, family migrants, and reset-
tled (overseas determined) refugees from protected per-
sons (including Convention refugees). A recent American
study points out that most of the economic integration
and impact research in Canada, the U.S. and Australia
focuses on resettled refugees, “with little attention to the
experiences  of those  entering through the asylum sys-
tem.”16 There are, however, studies that analyze trends
and economic consequences of immigration. These stud-
ies provide a broad picture of the effects immigration has
on host countries in term of per capita output (small net
gains but their distribution may be uneven), unemploy-
ment (no impact), and impact on government expendi-
tures and revenues (negligible).17 Refugees are included in
these analyses but their specific impact is unknown and most
likely an extremely small factor. In any given year “in Can-
ada”  refugees compose  a very  small  proportion  of total
immigration. In 2001, refugees represented 12.5 per cent of
total immigration. Over the past decade this number has
fluctuated slightly but remained between 9 and 15 per cent:
a very small population.18
The most thorough example of research on the impacts
of refugees vis-à-vis other forms of migrants on receiving
countries, conducted through the United Nations Univer-
sity, discusses the factors that determine the impact of
asylum, as distinct from other forms of migration, and
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discusses factors such as the number of asylum seek-
ers/refugee claimants, government policies,  and  socio-
economic  characteristics.  As  might be  suspected, their
conclusions suggest that the impact differs depending on
the country involved and their respective policies.19 Gov-
ernment policies for determining refugee status impact
the host countries in various ways. If policies are complex
with many administrative layers, fiscal costs increase. The
impact of refugees will vary depending on the skills and
on the socio-economic and demographic characteristics
of claimants and Convention refugees. The level of inte-
gration into the host country (including issues such as
work permits; access to social welfare programs, includ-
ing health and financial aid; education; and language
training) will also significantly change the picture. The
authors conclude that: “depending on the nature and
effectiveness of some of the policies, those granted asylum
or complementary protection may become quickly self-
supporting or languish for lengthy periods of time on
public assistance.”20
Methodology
The lack of quantitative research in refugee issues presented
several problems for this study. As a result, after a broad
literature review and focus on academic and governmental
information, a survey for Convention refugees was designed
and interviews conducted with selected refugees as well as
with various settlement agencies located in Toronto, On-
tario, during July and August of 2003.
Interviews
Approximately 60 per cent of all newcomers to Canada
settle in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). Much of the
support these newcomers receive comes from a pre-existing
community of immigrants and refugees in Toronto, as well
as multicultural and faith-based organizations. These set-
tlement agencies have specific programs to assist new im-
migrants and refugees integrate into Canadian society and
have knowledge of the obstacles faced by refugees during
their first few years in Canada. Our primary researcher met
and interviewed either the executive director or the director
of settlement services of fifteen settlement agencies in the
GTA. The interviews served to gain a more in-depth under-
standing of problems in integration faced by Convention
refugees as a whole.
Refugee Survey
The  survey was sent to, and completed  by, Convention
refugees  from each region  of  Canada  and  from  various
countries of origin. While there are other types of limbo that
exist, this study is focused on Convention refugees who have
not yet been granted permanent residence in Canada, and
so is limited to those who meet that criterion. Many refugees
were located with assistance from the settlement agencies
with which the interviews had been conducted. As predicted,
most of the surveys were completed by those persons who
have been in limbo for a considerable period of time.
Surveying began in early July 2003 and ended in August
2003. Both snowballing and cold calls were used to connect
with Convention refugees. Surveys were answered by per-
sonal interviews with the researcher or settlement worker
and via phone interviews. Attempts were made to match
survey respondents with national refugee demographics.
After the first week the survey was updated, refined for
clarity, and translated into French and Spanish.
Research Findings
Interviewing refugees poses unique challenges that include
language barriers, fear that information could be used
against them, and misunderstandings. We also encountered
more general difficulties. We had to discard about ten sur-
veys because they were not properly completed. For reasons
of time as well as in the interests of broader results, volun-
teers were used to conduct the survey. While we attempted
to brief everyone in a similar way, there is little doubt that
this affected results.
With a response rate of between 30 and 40 per cent,
fifty-eight surveys were completed. Given the preliminary
nature of this research, we were pleased with these results,
but realize that in order for the conclusions to be used more
broadly, a larger sampling needs to be done.
There were also some research and data sets that we did
not receive for various reasons. Questions about the average
time spent in limbo remain unanswered: our survey sug-
gests slightly over four years. However, there were a large
number of Somalis in our survey group; as a group, their
lack of documentation places them at an increased risk for
longer periods in limbo. Citizenship and Immigration
could not provide us with their statistics, nor with informa-
tion on how many refugees use the “Aden Agreement dec-
larations” (now section 178 of the IRPA regulations) for
landing purposes, which may increase time spent in limbo.
Perhaps the most frustrating part is the lack of appropri-
ate data collection by Statistics Canada and other data
organizations. The distinction between" immigrants" and
“refugees” is not consistently used, forcing researchers into
generalizations and suppositions. Particularly in a field
marked by rhetoric and a significant amount of confusion
among the general public, consistent and accurate data would
go far in increasing understanding amongst all involved.
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The preliminary results below are based on our inter-
views and the limited other information currently available.
It creates a framework for further, more detailed research.
Part 3. Barriers to Integration
The central concern that informs this research is the cost of
keeping people in the category of protected persons for an
extended period of time prior to granting them permanent
residence. This section will briefly look at some of the major
areas in which this limbo impacts the Canadian public,
including the impact on “Canadians-in-waiting” – pro-
tected persons. The purpose is to provide some preliminary
findings and to delineate areas for further research of the
economic costs and benefits of this element of the refugee
system in Canada.
As previously stated, protected persons have more rights
in Canada than do refugee claimants, but are also marked
by particular restrictions and barriers usually absent from
the experience of permanent residents and citizens. The
authors of this paper argue that these barriers – which affect
areas as diverse and important  as  employment,  mental
health, finances, and personal privacy and security – are det-
rimental to both the individual refugee and host country.
Barriers manifest themselves in various forms. Some are
the result of deliberate policies regarding protected persons,
designed and implemented by the various levels of govern-
ment. These include financial, personal, and social restric-
tions. Protected persons cannot sponsor family members
overseas and are faced with particular mobility restrictions.
In the same vein, they are not eligible for various govern-
ment and social services, including domestic tuition rates
at universities and colleges in several provinces. Other types
of impediments are not in themselves policies, but are the
foreseeable and negative consequences of immigration de-
cisions that have been aggravated by the increasing time
spent in limbo. Chief among the latter are employment and
health concerns; while it is illegal, there is some evidence to
suggest that protected persons are subject to exploitation
by less-than-scrupulous employers, who are aware of their
somewhat precarious situation.21 The strain of limbo, in
particular family separation as well as the stresses of seeking
refuge in a foreign country, is also a considerable factor in
relation to mental and physical health. Protected persons
are ineligible for bank loans and various other forms of
credit, while simultaneously being required to raise money
to pay their landing fees.
Labour Market
Labour market barriers are the easiest to identify and also
the most important for successful integration into Cana-
dian society. In 2002, Citizenship and Immigration Deputy
Minister Michel Dorais wrote that newcomers to Canada
“experience difficulty entering the labour market. The ab-
sence of effective credential assessment and recognition
process, as well as insufficient supports for work related
language training, contributes to the gap between immi-
grant earnings and employment rates and those of Cana-
dian-born workers.”22 Dorais recognizes that having the
ability to work in Canada is the most important way to
integrate into Canadian society.
For Convention refugees, finding work can be extremely
difficult and frustrating. Many factors impede refugees
from having the same access to employment as permanent
residents and citizens, so many settle for low-paying, service
industry positions. Racism, stereotypes, lack of training
opportunities, language, work ethic misconceptions, and a
900-series Social Insurance Number (SIN)23 all are impedi-
ments to employment.24 Certain jobs are out of reach be-
cause the necessary licensing (i.e., for truck drivers) is only
available to permanent residents and Canadian citizens.
If I have landing I have better job, life will be much different.
Always have problem with my children, for their summer vaca-
tion they like to go on vacation but I have no vacation and must
work…I’m fed up with CIC…my kids are always asking when
I will get my landing. I send lots from my lawyer and many
different letters, [I’m] always doing something, do medical
check, do this, do that but always same, never landed. – A
Somalian Convention Refugee
The most thorough study done on this subject to date
came from the University of Alberta, which surveyed 525
refugees and their experiences in Alberta between 1992 and
1997. It found major employment barriers that included
limited English language skills, discrimination on the part
of employers, lack of Canadian work experience, and an
unwillingness on the part of professional bodies to recog-
nize foreign training or work credentials. Interestingly, pro-
fessionals, the most skilled and educated of all refugees,
faced the most austere barriers from licensing bodies like
the Canadian Medical Association, which would not recog-
nize their credentials. Three out of four Convention refu-
gees were not able to obtain managerial/professional
employment after coming to Canada.25
The conclusions of the University of Alberta study are
very instructive about conditions refugees face upon arriv-
ing in Canada. According to the study, “refugees are also
much more likely than the Canadian workforce as a whole
to be employed in non-standard jobs, which typically pay
less, offer fewer fringe benefits, and have much less job
security.”26 Many refugees need training programs to im-
prove upward mobility. Presently these are available
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through the government for Canadian citizens and perma-
nent residents only.
Family Reunification
Convention refugees who have not been landed are not able
to sponsor spouses or dependent children to Canada until
they themselves  become permanent residents. A united
family gives the refugee further support to cope with the
stresses of resettlement and an increased flexibility to adjust
to a new country and culture. Khalida (see preface) is a
perfect example of the effects of family separation gone too
long. She and her children have not seen their husband and
father for six years. She is ill from the compounded stress
of adapting to a new country, single parenting, financial
problems, and anxiety concerning her spouse in Afghani-
stan. Her health has deteriorated to the point where she
needs assistance with simple day-to-day activities.
Mental Health
This separation of family leads to another major problem
area facing the refugee community – mental health. One of
the tenets of mental health is that a period of rapid and
significant change places increased strain on an individual’s
mental health.27 In a letter to the editor in the Toronto Star,
Alejandro Ferrino wrote that:
...during the past 13 months, my Argentinean wife, whom I
married in Toronto  in  1999, and I  have  had to deal with
emotional stress and economic struggles as we performed a
number of steps required for her to become a resident. The
waiting period became a nightmare full of anxiety, anguish,
irritability, apathy and frustration…to be left in limbo seems an
arbitrary price to pay.28
One worker from an ethno-racial mental health centre
estimated that 90 per cent of all refugees experience anxiety,
stress, distress, or depression.29 However, it is important to
recognize that the assumption that the entire refugee popu-
lation is mentally disturbed and in need of psychiatric care
needs to be avoided. Many refugees are very resilient and
adaptive and have managed to navigate the refugee process
without requiring significant aid from mental health net-
works.
If I look over the general criteria to diagnosis Mental disorders
– Dissatisfaction with one’s characteristics, abilities and accom-
plishments, ineffective or unsatisfactory relationships, dissatis-
faction with one’s place in the world or confusion coping with
live events and lack on personal grown – I see I was mental
illness. Example when people talk to me about what matters I
start crying. I could not have any long conversation with any
body because the teardrops came out. – Refugee in New Bruns-
wick]
In a recent article regarding refugees and resettlement,
Dr. Ralph Masi, founder of the Canadian Council of Mul-
ticultural Health, notes that:
There are issues specific to particular ages and genders. Young
people may have difficulty fitting in with peers because they
speak differently or lack the same cultural reference
points….Women and seniors may face a loss of independence
and social support structures.30
By virtue of their status as someone seeking refuge, refu-
gees are likely to have experienced trauma and extreme
stress, which may place them at a higher risk for mental
health problems. They may be in need of professional
treatment but seeking and finding a physician or psychia-
trist to work with refugees presents particular difficulties.
While there remains a persistent stigma attached to seeking
counselling and mental health care within Canadian society
at large, there are also specific concerns, such as language
barriers, cultural norms, and a fear of jeopardizing the
immigration process, which can make it more difficult for
protected persons to seek the necessary help. The timing is
also important: the mental health agency with whom we
spoke only saw cases where the mental health effects had
become debilitating to the individual. Help sought earlier
may have decreased the seriousness of the symptoms and
of the care necessary.
Yet remarkably, a study conducted for the Centre for
Addiction and Mental Health found no evidence to confirm
the expectation that refugees were at a higher risk for mental
health problems due to their experiences prior to arrival in
Canada. It concluded that “while the refugee situation un-
doubtedly creates a situation of risk for mental health, risk
is not destiny.”31 Experiences that occur prior to arriving in
the new country have a smaller effect than what happens to
refugees during resettlement. Being trapped in limbo and
separated from family, possessing inadequate language
skills, facing employment discrimination and discrimina-
tion from Canadian nationals pose a greater risk of devel-
oping future mental health problems than their experience
of fleeing persecution.32
Mobility
Convention refugees are not afforded Canadian passports,
and undocumented persons are often denied travel docu-
ments. This  effectively  prevents refugees from  travelling
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abroad to visit family members. Given that many refugees
in Canada send money abroad to support family members,
contact between family members in these situations is criti-
cal to be sure money is being received and that they are
healthy. The CCR notes that even when a family member is
sick and dying, travel documents can be difficult to obtain.33
Refugees may also fear they will be refused entry to Canada
on their return. Under new regulations, permanent resi-
dents are given a permanent resident card, a standard and
“normalized” document which serves as a substitute for a
Canadian passport. This is the card and status for which
refugees in limbo are waiting.
Political Rights
Only Canadian citizens are entitled to vote in Canada. As
the time between the granting of protected person status
and permanent residence increases, so does the time be-
tween arrival and full citizenship rights. Such rights are
pivotal to the development of refugees as new Canadians:
as Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen states in
his book Development as Freedom, political freedom arises
with the right to vote. “The rulers have the incentive to
listen to what the people want if they have to face criticism
and seek their support in elections. Political rights…are not
only pivotal in inducing social responses to economic
needs,  they are also  central to the conceptualization of
economic needs themselves.”34 By lengthening the period
in which individuals are denied meaningful participation
in the political system, we may also be increasing the risk
that these people will remain removed from such participa-
tion, even as full citizens.
Landing Fee
As mentioned  in the first section, protected persons are
required to pay a $550 landing fee for each adult seeking
permanent residence, and $100 for each dependent child.
While these costs may not appear prohibitive to many settled,
employed, and fully entitled citizens, they present an early
and serious obstacle to the landing process. Refugees are not
eligible for bank loans and credit cards, as well as various
other forms of credit, making access to large sums of money
– needed for the landing fee as well as furniture, rent, trans-
portation, clothes, and other necessities – difficult.
Security and Medical Checks
Security and criminality checks performed by CSIS and the
RCMP, as stated above, are uncoordinated. Each check is
performed separately and each organization works with
different organizations  overseas. If and when CSIS sees
something incongruent, flags are raised and the process can
stretch from weeks to months, even to years. The RCMP
also wants a  second set of fingerprints  – already  taken
during the front-end screening process – for a separate
criminal database.
Medical certificates and security checks can play an in-
sidious game of cat and mouse, leaving the Convention
refugee trapped in a cycle. Medical checks expire after
twelve months while Security checks expire after eighteen.
Often the medical will expire before the security process is
complete. The medical will have to be redone only to have
the security check expire. This cycle can be very frustrating
as well as potentially confusing, leading to increased risk of
mistakes and bureaucratic delays.
Procedural Changes and Discretion
There has been significant criticism of the Canadian refugee
determination process from many fronts, some of which
was addressed with the new IRPA legislation. However,
there remain many areas in which the discretion of one
individual, employed either by the Ministry of Citizenship
and Immigration or the IRB, can delay or severely stall the
landing process. While the system designed under the IRPA
has some measures to counteract this, several of them
(including the refugee appeals board for the IRB) have not
been implemented. The number of changes which has oc-
curred over the past few years has also increased confusion
within the system, felt by government officials, advocacy
and legal workers, settlement agencies, and the refugees
themselves.
Part 4. Economic Impacts
The flip side of finding the economic impacts to Canada of
keeping refugees in limbo is the direct cost of Canada’s
refugee determination system. Again, due to lack of full
information available, these findings are preliminary.
Labour Market
Costs to Convention refugees in limbo due to barriers in the
labour market are the easiest to quantify. Refugees discrimi-
nated against or limited because of legal status incur oppor-
tunity costs of labour. The Conference Board of Canada has
completed the best research in this area with a study entitled
Brain Gain: The Economic Benefits of Recognizing Learning
and Learning Credentials in Canada. This study focussed on
three groups who would gain the most if their learning
credentials were recognized, with immigrants being the larg-
est group. Their major finding is that, if Canada were to
eliminate the learning recognition gap, it would give Cana-
dians an additional $4.1 to $5.9 billion in income annually.35
From this study, which makes no distinction between im-
migrants and refugees, we can deduce an estimate of forgone
income due to unrecognized learning for refugees.
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The authors of the Brain Gain study estimated that the
number of people in Canada that are affected by unrecog-
nized foreign credentials equates to 344,723 people. In
order to provide a rough picture of the lost earnings for
refugees in limbo, we assumed that refugees follow Cana-
dian employment characteristics.36 Based on the number of
refugees in this state, and applying the estimate of forgone
earnings to the figures, results in an overall estimate of
potential earnings from reducing the barriers of limbo of
over $334 million dollars.
Social Assistance
In  terms  of social  assistance, there is a large  difference
between immigrants and refugees, as the former have more
choices in terms of employment and mobility. For statisti-
cal purposes, as Convention refugees move through the
system and gain landed status, they are grouped with im-
migrants as the legal status of the two converges. A great
deal of information can be deduced by comparing the
situations of immigrants and Convention refugees. Our
survey asked Convention refugees what government serv-
ices they used while in limbo. By far the most frequent
response was welfare with 81 per cent having received social
assistance for at least one month. Most refugees reported
being on welfare prior to being deemed a Convention
refugee, as well as afterward. However, there is a drastic
drop in the numbers once landed status has been gained,
with only 17 per cent of all immigrant families receiving
some form of government assistance.37
To measure welfare spending by the  government  on
Convention refugees, average annual rates of government
transfers to Convention refugee households were found.
The proportion of Convention refugees on welfare, 81 per
cent, was then used to measure the total number of limbo
refugee households on welfare and multiplied through by
the annual average each household receives. The monetary
figures that correspond to this are staggering. According to
our survey, Convention refugees in 2002 received an esti-
mated $129,115,689 in welfare payments.38 Assuming 17
per cent of immigrant households remain on government
assistance, the number of cases in Canada was divided by
17 and multiplied by average social assistance payments.
This  found that  after refugees are  landed, their welfare
needs decrease substantially to an estimated total of
$27,437,084, a savings of over $101 million dollars.
Mental Health
As discussed in the previous chapter, protected persons face
a variety of stresses that can affect their well-being and place
them at risk of mental health problems. Nevertheless, based
on the lack of research (also previously discussed), it is
difficult to ascertain the costs of this increased risk. The
estimated total burden to Canada of mental health problems
is among the costliest conditions in Canada at $14.4 bil-
lion.39 However, information specific to the refugee situ-
ation is not available. Research to estimate an accurate
refugee-specific economic cost is beyond the scope of this
paper and is an area where further research is sorely needed.
Administrative Costs
Accurate estimates of the costs of the refugee system itself
are hard to find. Not knowing an accurate breakdown of
costs  within  the refugee determination system has been
problematic for this study. Several pieces of information
critical for a rigorous analysis are simply not available. Pub-
lic data collection capabilities need to be improved for fur-
ther research.
To begin to quantify the administrative costs of keeping
seventeen thousand or more case files in the system for
periods as long as a decade is formidable. A study of this
nature would require significant research and the collection
of mass data as well as its analysis, which is not available for
this project. However, it seems safe to assume that in terms
of government effort, there would be a significant cost, both
in terms of human resources and budget, involved in keep-
ing all of these files current.
Conclusion
Canada has traditionally been one of the most welcoming
countries in the world for refugees. However, this reputation
is quickly eroding in the post-September 11 era, being chal-
lenged by changes to Canada’s immigration policy and
heightened global and national security concerns. The
number of refugees landed in Canada is declining every year
– from 12,991 in 2000 to 10,544 in 2002 – and this will
certainly continue if Canada and the U.S. implement the Safe
Third Country agreement.40 A July 2003 BBC news report
said, “it seems Canada is moving more towards, rather than
away from, a stricter system like Australia’s, in which civil
servants decide claims and more people will be detained.”41
Convention refugees in Canada experience long delays
in achieving permanent resident status. During this time
they experience many impediments blocking integration
into Canadian society. Direct barriers are felt in the labour
market where quality employment is difficult to find. Refu-
gees cannot open bank accounts or gain access to credit
while some Convention refugees cannot afford the neces-
sary fees. Indirect effects include a deterioration in one’s
mental health caused by needing to adjust to a new culture
and dealing with family separation and/or poverty.
Economic research with regard to refugees is difficult to
find. Most importantly, we tried to find the cost of main-
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taining a refugee system in Canada. While we could not find
an actual figure, there is a strong and general perception in
Canada is that it must be very high, maybe even too high.
In his book Who Gets In, nominated for the annual Donner
Prize for best book on Canadian public policy in 2003,
Daniel Stoffman claims that Canada’s refugee program “no
doubt accounts for a major portion of the $4 billion-a-year
cost of immigration…”42 Unfortunately, this figure can’t be
sourced to any government publication. Even more discon-
certing is how the statement misleads readers into thinking
that the only associated costs are government expenditures.
We hope this study alters this parochial way of thinking.
This research finds that there are other costs related to the
refugee determination system. A process that hinders refu-
gee integration poses undue costs to Canada in the form of
suppressed labour market activity, debilitation from men-
tal duress, excessive use of social assistance, and other
barriers. An effective and efficient system will greatly miti-
gate most of these costs.
Our preliminary research estimates show that Canada’s
refugee system is highly inefficient and likely impedes refu-
gee integration. We find that Canada spends over an esti-
mated $129 mill ion on government transfers to
Convention refugees in limbo. With automatic landing,
government transfers would decrease dramatically with an
estimated savings of over $101 million. Our research also
finds that refugees lose over $334 million in forgone income
due to barriers in the labour market. Racism, stereotypes,
lack of training opportunities, and language are all impedi-
ments to employment. These large costs only account for
two barriers, albeit two larger ones. Further study into the
economic costs of these and other barriers is an area in dire
need of attention.
Our findings and estimates were limited by resources,
timeframe, and information availability. A more thorough
investigation, unhindered by these factors, is required for a
clearer picture of the economic costs of delaying landing for
refugees. A more rigorous analysis would ideally include
several reports on the economic consequences of specific
barriers. For example, mental health problems in refugees
are extensively studied by psychologists and psychiatrists
but rarely with an economic focus. The refugee community
is sorely in need of this type of research to buttress their
arguments and to refute some of the anti-immigrant, anti-
refugee claims in the media.
The lack of research into Canada’s refugee system pre-
vents the dissemination of information that could bolster
arguments made by Canada’s refugee community, that
immigration is a boon, or at the very least, entails zero cost
to Canada. Canada’s refugee community draws largely on
moral and legal arguments for advocacy but there is a need
for a different perspective. Economic studies have proven
to be a very effective means of garnering attention to issues
(for example, poverty and its effect on the health care
system) and we hope this study provides a similar impetus
for refugee issues. This research can be used as a spring-
board for such further research.
To our knowledge this study is the first attempt to place
an economic value on a particular aspect of Canada’s refugee
determination system. Being the initial study, several issues
were encountered that should be discussed. One of the rea-
sons refugee research may not be prevalent could be the poor
condition of data sources. As mentioned earlier, Statistics
Canada does not separate refugees from immigrants in their
data tables. Citizenship and Immigration Canada has basic
information on the number of Convention refugees entering
Canada annually but nothing more detailed.
Through our research we found that Convention refugees
in limbo face challenging circumstances. Every day, refugees
must negotiate a new culture with a hard journey behind
them and a hard journey ahead. There is much that can be
done to ease the plight of refugees in Canada. Of greatest
importance is to grant permanent resident status simultane-
ously with Convention refugee status at the Immigration and
Refugee Board hearing. The first step for this becoming a
reality is to understand the consequences limbo places on Can-
ada and refugees. This research starts to take us there.
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